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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

IS A SPRAINED BACK, SUFFERED ON THE JOB WHILE A
PERSON PERFORMS HIS OR HER NORMAL TASK OF LIFTING,
AN ACCIDENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IF THERE IS A MEDICALLY DEMONSTRATED CAUSAL
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INJURY AND THE WORK?
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The Plaintiff, Gloria Carmen Herrera is a 25 year old

female who, at the time of

her injury,

worked at

Sperry Univac

Corporation. (R. 3)

2.

She

had

worked there

approximately six

(6) months

prior to the date of her injury. (R. 4)

3.

Her duties

included picking

up computer

the ground and placing them on a conveyor belt.

units from

(R. 4)

4.

These units weighed between 20 and 100 pounds. (R. 5)

5.

This task involved a lifting and then

turning motion

while holding the computer unit. (R. 5)

6.

On

May

3, 1985,

the Plaintiff

was lifting

these units, and as she turned, she felt a pop in

one of

her back.

(R.

5)

7.

The Plaintiff reported the

that day and then continued working.
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injury to
(R. 6)

her supervisor

8.

She was

thereafter examined

by several

diagnosed her as having suffered a sprained back*

9.

Medical

examinations

revealed

between the claimant's work task and her
Dr. Gene R. Smith,

R. 47).

(For

a

doctors who

(R. 7)

causal connection

back injury

ease of

(Report of

reference, a

this report along with the Administrative Law Judge's
Fact

and

Conclusion

of

Law,

and the

copy of

Finding of

Industrial Commission's

Denial of Motion for Review are included as the addendum

to this

brief).

10.

As

a

result

of this

condition, the

Plaintiff has

constant backaches and headaches and cannot sit or walk
periods of time.

11.

The

for long

(R. 7)

Administrative

Law

Judge

ruled,

and

the

Industrial Commission affirmed that because the claimant's injury
occurred in the course of her normal work duties, her

injury was

not the result

[t]here is

of a

compensable "accident"

in that

nothing to take her activity on that day out of the realm of what
could

be considered

usual and

normal activities"

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order

of the

(Findings of

Administrative Law

Judge, R. 88-90; Denial of Motion for Review, R. 103).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Industrial Commission was in error in ruling that the
Plaintiff suffered no "accident" when she injured her back during
the normal course of

her job.

The

determination of

"accident" has occurred should not depend
was sustained during usual

exertion or

question should depend on whether there

whether an

on whether
activities.
is an

the injury
Rather, the

unexpected injury

and whether there is a medically demonstrable causal relationship
between the person's work duties and the unexpected injury.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

UNEXPECTED INJURIES INCURRED WHILE
PERFORMING ONE'S USUAL DUTIES SHOULD
BE COMPENSABLE UNDER UTAH'S WORKMAN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS WHEN A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORK AND THE
INJURY EXISTS.

The Administrative Law Judge

in this

case ruled

that a

back injury occurring in the course of one's employment duties is
not an "accident" compensable under Utah's Workman's Compensation
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laws if the

activity is

"usual and

normal."

She also

did not

refer the case to a medical panel because she found there
"accident".

As the following

discussion will

was no

demonstrate, this

is an improper interpretation of Utah law.

Utah Code section 35-1-45 states:

Every employee...who is injured by accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment... shall be
paid compensation.

U.C.A. section 35-1-45

(Supp. 1984).

It has been held that the meaning of the
is a question of law.
888,

890

meaning.

(Utah
It

Kaiser Steel Corp.

1981).

connotes

The
an

term

v. Monfredi,

"...should

unanticipated,

be expected

usual

v. Industrial

events". Carling

Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
ordinary

work

task

202, 203
may be

(1965).

Workmen's

Compensation, section

given

to occur

accident even

A. Larson,

38.30, (1965).

in the

by one's

1 The
"The

if no
Law of

fact that

overexertion is more apt to cause internal failure than is
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broad

Commission, 16

Injury caused

considered an

unusual exertion or activity is shown.

be

631 p.2d

unintended occurrence

different from what would normally
course of

term "accident"

ordinary

exertion

overexertion

to

is

no

sustain

reason
an

[to]

award."

...require

Purity

proof

of

Co.

v.

Biscuit

Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961, 969 (Utah 1949).

However, in deciding whether an injury is

an "accident",

the Industrial Commission has adopted a test which unduly narrows
the

scope

of

the

inquiry

coverage injuries that, being
"accidents".

In reality,

and

which therefore

unanticipated and

there are

which qualify as "accidents".

dump

truck.

When

an

of injuries

The first category is comprised of

an employee
injury

unintended, are

two categories

unexpected activities which result in injury.
category would be where

excludes from

is run

falls

into

An example of this
over by
this

a run-away

category,

question of whether an accident has occurred is generally

the

not an

issue.

In the second category, the injury takes
unexpected

result

example of this

an

would be

back while lifting.
ways on the

from

Case

question of

qualify

as

where an

or

normal

authority can

be found
in the

of an

activity.

employee suffers

whether injury

qualifies as an accident.
injuries

expected

the form

An

a sprained

pointing both
second category

One line of Utah cases holds that such

accidents.

Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695

See

Schmidt

(Utah 1980).
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v.

Industrial

See also, Purity

Biscuit Co* v* Industrial Commission, 115 Utah
969

(1949).

However,

another

injuries are not compensable.

line

of

1, 201

P.2d 961,

cases holds

that such

Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo,

642 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah 1982); Farmer's Grain Co-op v. Mason, 606
P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1980); and Church of

Jesus Christ

of Latter

Day Saints v. Industrial

Thurman, 590

P.2d 328,

Commission and

329-30 (Utah 1979). The Industrial Commission
the latter line of cases

to mean

the course of one's duties
are

usual

and

normal

that injuries

are not

unless

has misinterpreted

accidents if

there

exertion or abnormal activities.

occuring during

is

also

the activities
present unusual

In reality in all of

cases where no compensation was awarded, no causation

the above
was shown.

Whether the activity was unusual or required extra exertion is an
indicator of causation sometimes, especially

in back

cases, but

it is not always determinative of causation.

As the remainder of this discussion will demonstrate, the
Industrial

Commission

interpretation

of

the

is
Sabo

in
line

error

in

relying

of

cases for

on

its

the following

reasons:

1.

First,

these

cases

were

decided

on the

issue of

causation as was the case they look to as their precedent; Redman
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Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398,
454 P.2d 283 (1969).

2.

Second, the Industrial Commission's interpretation of

the law is not in line with the majority of jurisdictions; and,

3,
of

Third, and most

"accident"

is contrary

importantly, a
to the

narrow determination

objective of

Utah Workmen's

Compensation Law.

A.

The

The Precedent of Redman

cases

holding

performance of one's
a

PPly

to

Redman

that

normal duties

Warehousing Corp*

Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969).
claim

for

back

injury

the claimant's

during the

rule of

v* Industrial

law they

Commission, 22

Redman was a case

involving a

evidenced itself

while the

Although driving the

usual duties,

loading and unloading the van.

incurred

trace the

that first

claimant was driving a moving van.
part of

injuries

his duties

van was

also included

The Industrial Commission decided

that the claimant's injuries were the result

of driving

and that this unlooked for result of his normal activities
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the van

qualified

as

decision on

an

accident*

However,

this court

a finding of a lack of causal connection between the

claimant's work activities and the injury.

Th e Redman court correctly decided
be able to establish a causal connection
work.

reversed that

Id* at 285.

that a

claimant must

between the

injury and

For, as the court stated:

To conclude otherwise would insure every
truck driver, every railroad engineer,
every airplane pilot, and a lot of others,
against a physiological malfunction or
physical collapse of any of hundreds of
human organs, completely unproven as to
cause, but compensable only by virtue of
the happenstance that the malfunction,
collapse or injury occurred while the
employee was on the job, and not home or
elsewhere, (emphasis added)

Id. at 285.

As a consequence, Redman stands for the proposition that before a
claimant may collect workmen's compensation for an injury
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incurred on the

job, he

or she

must be

able to

causal connection between his or her normal

demonstrate a

work duties

and the

injury sustained.

However, the causation requirement of Redman as
Sabo, Mason, and Thurman has been
Commission
injuries

into an
occurring

over-simplistic rule
during

exertion are compensable.
rule.

nonordinary

vehicle

was

on the

injuries

of the

occurring

or unusual

that the

that only
activity or

during

for the

one's

to believe

act of

claimant's injury.

Hence, there is no precedent in Redman
all

which holds

court's inability

Commission's finding
the cause

the Industrial

Redman clearly does not stand for this

Redman simply turns

the Industrial

interpreted by

found in

driving a

][d.

at 285.

requirement that

normal

job

are

not

compensable and that unusual exertion need be shown.

B.

The Industrial Commission's decision disagrees
with the majority position.

In

addition,

Commission

disagrees

the

rule

with the

applied

by

majority rule.

the

Industrial

The

majority of

jurisdictions hold that when usual exertion leads to

an internal

breakdown of some sort, the injury is accidental.
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A. Larson, 1

The Law of Workmen's Compensation,

Section

38.30

(1965).

As a

consequence, to uphold the Industrial Commission's decision would
place Utah out of step with the majority of jurisdictions.

The Industrial Commission1s rule is contrary to

C.

the objective of Workmen's Compensation Law.

Finally, the

rule applied

by the

Industrial Commission

fails to compensate injures the rule was intended to
compensable.

identify as

The word "accident" should be given a broad meaning

to effectuate the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act which
is to give workers injured on the
benefits.

job quick

and easy

Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 15 Utah 2d

P.2d 616, 617 (1963); See also, Monfredi,
rule applied by the

Industrial Commission

pp. 890

allow

between

the

because

of

achieves
this

claims

in

work

task

its

just the

case,

relationship

when

which there

purports to

and

narrow and

the injury.

between

is a

the

invites claims for injuries

It

clear and

work

task and

that are

and happenstance.
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The

weed out

and thereby

causal connection

However,

in reality,

over-simplistic approach,

opposite result.
there

exists a

20, 386

and 892.

claims where the injury is the result of coincidence
only

access to

the test

excludes claims,

as in

medically demonstrable
the injury,

the result

while it

of coincidence

The

anomolous

results

engendered

illustrated by the following example.

by

this

rule

Suppose Party A

and Party

B both suffer back injuries while lifting a crate at work.
A's

normal

task

involves

lifting

and

a

are

Party

medical examination

reveals a degenerative condition in A's back, caused by the heavy
labor, and
injury.
lifting.

that this

condition culminated

in the

present back

On the other hand, Party B's usual duties do not involve
However,

a

medical

congenital condition in

examination

his back

which has

of

B

reveals

caused the

degenerate to such a point as to be overly susceptible
and that

the lifting

conincidentally triggered

a

back to
to injury

this condition,

resulting in the injury.

In the case of Party A,
Industrial
nonordinary

Commission's
activity

rule

even

there is

no recovery

because there

was no

though

lifting

on

medically demonstrable cause of A's

injury.

On the

Party B can recover even though

the lifting

under the
unusual or

the job

is the

other hand,

wcis not

really the

cause but rather was merely a condition of the injury —

the fact

that the injury occurred on the job being merely fortuitous.

The

test applied

by the

case lends itself to such results.
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Industrial Commission

in this

It is a mechanical approach

which

is circumstantial

rather than

causal oriented.

Clearly,

such a rule is over simplistic and not properly tailored

to weed

out claims where causation does not exist.

The

better

test

injury was unforeseen.
in most cases.
Taking

It

"accident"

would be

This broad test would not

should be

the evidence

demonstrable

for

as a

followed by

whole, does

connection between

whether the

be dispositive

a test

of causation.

there exist

work and

a medically

the injury.

words, the work task must be shown to be the efficient
not merely a condition to the injury.
claim of this nature, the case
panel

for

a

determination

the

referred to

issue

Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d
(in

the

case of

aspects of the
medical panel is

accidental injury,

case, including
mandatory).

a medical

of causation.

See,

693, 696

(Utah 1980)

submission of

the medical

the issue
In the

cause and

As a consequence, in every

should be
on

In other

of causation,

present case,

Administrative Law Judge did not find in

favor of

to the

because the

the existence

of an accident she did not submit the case to a medical panel.

Note that such a test would not
any of the

previously cited

decisions.

change the

results in

For example,

as stated

before, Redman can be explained on the basis of the court's
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inability to believe that there was

a causal

the claimant's back injury and his job of
in

light

of

the

fact

that

Similarly, in
lift crates as part
tasks as his primary

I^d. at

operated a business known as Sabo's

probability,

Thurman.

not the

According

to

medical

opinion in that case, the claimant

perform such
owned and

Electronic Service).

primary cause.

the

did not

required to

723 (claimant

as to him, lifting, although a condition to
all

performed strenuous

claimant, although

job, probably

activity.

moving van,

Ijd. at 285.

Sabo, the
of his

driving a

he regularly

lifting without suffering injury.

connection between

his injury,
The

report

Hence,
was, in

same is

true of

contained

suffered from

condition which does not appear to be work related.

in

the

a degenerative
Ijd.

Hence, his work task was also a condition rather than a

at 330.
cause of

his injury.

On the other hand, in Purity

Biscuit this

Court allowed

compensation for back injury incurred during the normal course of
the claimant's duties which included, among other things, driving
a truck.

!Ed. at 962.

Commission's

finding

This decision was based on
that

the

claimant's

work

the Industrial
task,

which

involved a great deal of "stooping and bending in lifting heavy
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packages" caused his spine to deteriorate to such an extent as to
result in his injury.

Id.

Similarly, in the present
Dr.

Smith,

Plaintiff's

reports

that

job

lifting.

of

disregarded and made of
that

holds

injuries

the

case, the
injury

This

no import
occurring

Plaintiff's doctor,

was

brought

evidence
by an

on

should

not

arbitrary rule

during

"usual

by the

and

be

of law
normal"

activities at work are per se not compensable.

CONCLUSION

The Plaintiff therefore
court

reverse

the Industrial

respectfully requests
Commission's decision

that this
and remand

this case for further hearing on damages.

DATED this

day of

April, 1986.

CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

DENTON My^HATCH
WESLEY M. LANG
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ADDENDUM

Medical Report of Dr. Gene R. Smith
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of
the Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission's Denial of Motion for Review.
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1»_ ..rRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
P. 0. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580

Date of i n j u r y J ^ k l J ^ 5 "
Employer S f e W y
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD
(To be completed by treating physician)
Permanent Impairment Evaluation for ur% CCLS> >w R ^ > AfCAA J?v2~
y
Name of Applicant
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? A/cD What date?

RE:

2.

Has applicant been released for light duty?.

3.

Has applicant a permanent injury?

What date?

If so, describe fully

}\dVrltTtSi>

^ ^ ^ '

'

4. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach
a final state of recovery? dS)L ,/)y, /4vf cigars aw
5. If there is a permanent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms
of percentage of loss of function:
\OK^J <=>*<-fe? c £ * "*~ /vf-/* &*<f>
6.
Is there a medically demonstrated causal relationship between the
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? y<«g<?r * Please
explain as necessary
^
7. What future medical treatment will be required
industrial accident? £ e v\ j^v'jyV^-e
f^cj
kzcJL

as a result of the
C^V«L-

8. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to
previously-existing conditions, whether due to accidental 'injury, disease or

congenital causes? §&£$^

SO 7* X # ^ %

-

#. AS* %

(LffAf

fl^

*y

9. What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from
all causes and conditions, including the industrial injury? JPt^
/o
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existing
condition? Please explain as necessary. *S f <?<£ *t-&4/V/ <L ^ & <?5 7Vo v* *

*3fday of

<£L r /€ £ „ ~<ft<*!'?)
Physician's Name (Please Print)

^/*^l

198/.$

&v'1r£? t fife c/cC Ju Y% *Y V
Physician's SoecLalty
'

y^e So

</<?d £

Street Address

/Sdc^^fcc/,
City and State

L£f

frof*

, , \

+ *<T«ti*J

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE No. 85000559

*
*
*

G. CARMEN HERRERA,

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant,
vs.
SPERRY CORPORATION,
TRAVELERS INSURANCE and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

AND ORDER

*
*
*
*
*

Defendant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 19,
1985, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Orgg?' and
Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present and represented by Wesley M.
Lang, Attorney at Law.
The Defendants
Attorney at Law.

were

represented

by

Thomas

Kay,

The issues presented in this matter were as follows:
1.

Whether the Applicant sustained injuries as the result *>f a
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985.

2#

Causal relationship of the incident to the Applicant's alleged
injuries.

3.

Temporary total disability compensation from May 6, 1985 through
the present date.

A*

Permanent partial impairment.

5.

Medical expenses.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
Inasmuch as one of the above listed issues is dispositive of the
others, the Administrative Law Judge will deal only with the issue of whether
the Applicant sustained injuries as the result of a compensable industrial
accident.
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The Applicant in this matter, G. Carmen Herrera, is a twenty-five
year old female who began working for the defendants at the ovens making
computer parts approximately^.six^months prior to the date of her injury. Her
duties included placing computer^units in the oven, pulling them out and
placing them on conveyor belts* The units themselves varied greatly in size,
ranging from twenty to one hundred-pounds. On the date of the alleged injury,
the Applicant was working ~with units which weighed approximately ^thirty
pounds. At the time of her alleged injury, the Applicant was earning $6.59
per hour working forty hours per week regular time and approximately^five
hours per week on overtimed The-Applicant was not married, nor did she have
any dependent children under the age of eighteen.
On May 3, 1985, the Applicant squatted down to pick up a unit which
weighed approximately thirty pounds. As she straightened, she felt a snap and
tingling pain in her low back. The Applicant informed her supervisor of the
problem.
She then went to the nurse* s station and obtained some medication
for pain. She was able to finish her shift.
The incident occurred on a Friday. The Applicant stayed in bed all
during the weekend because of her pain. She went to work on Monday with
continuing pain and was sent by her supervisor and the nurse to Dr. Anderson.
Her first visit with Dr. Anderson occurred on May 6, 1985. At that time,
x-rays were taken and an examination was done. The Applicant was taken off
work for the rest of the week. Her leave later extended through September.
During that time, the Applicant was referred to Dr. Chester Powell. She also
saw Dr. Gene Smith upon a referral from her attorney.
The Applicant returned to work on September 23, 1985 per her doctor's
release. She has a new job where she is able to regulate her activities. At
the time of the hearing, she still had a constant backache and was not able to
participate in any of her regular activities such as jogging or roller skating.
During the time the Applicant was out of work, she did receive the
$181.00 a week payment from a disability insurance policy.
The Applicant has had some prior injuries to her left knee and left
hip. She indicated, however, that prior to May 3, 1985, she had never had any
problems with her low back.
In reviewing the facts in this matter, it is the considered opinion
of the Administrative Law Judge that the Applicant has not met her burden in
demonstrating that a compensable industrial accident occurred on May 3, 1985.
Counsel for the Applicant cites the MONFREDI case as precedence finding that
the Applicant sustained injuries as the result of a compensable accident.
However, the Administrative Law Judge notes that there were substantial
differences between the facts in the Applicant's case and those in the
MONFREDI case.
In that instance, the worker was performing a usual work
activity; however, the Applicant had also had numerous prior industrial
injuries to his low back and the Court adjudged the incident of usual activity
to be a culmination of the results of the prior industrial accidents. The
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Applicant in this matter has no record of prior industrial injuries to her low
back. The facts_in this case are much closer to those announced in the SABQ
case. Although it is clear in this case that the ApplicantJJOactiyijty_j*as
work related, there was nothing junusual about the activityThe Applicant
testified
that
she had
lifted s heavier
computers
at various times.
Additionally, she indicated very clearly on the record that her normal
procedure in lifting the parts was to squat, lift and straighten and then turn
to place them on the conveyor belt. She testified that there was no variation
from this procedure on May 3,- 1985* There is nothing to take her activity on
that day out of' the realm of what could be considered usual and normal
activities, ynder the Applicant's description, Jthe same type of injury could
have just as easily occurred had she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or
a bag of groceries.
The Administrative Law Judge notes that there is some question as to
whether a work relationship between the activity and the injury is sufficient
to allow for a finding of compensable accident.
The matter is currently
pending before the Supreme Court in three cases which have been joined for
hearing. It is very possible .that the decisions in those cases may alter a
finding such as this one of "no accident".
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Applicant in this matter, G. Carmen Herrera, has failed in her
burden to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of a
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985 and her claim for benefits
should be denied.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim
Applicant, be, in the same is hereby, dismissed.
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DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On or about November 27, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were .denied in the above
entitled case.
On or about December 12, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Applicant by and through her attorney.
Thereaf r, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of November 27, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall bs, and the cczio ij hereby, dariie*!.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
ATTEST:

day

of

Januar r

) »

*!-,
Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

1986..

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

y

ZlrffitK^Cfr-rs/
Commissioner

Lenice~"L. Nielsen
Commissioner

*

